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Abstract
The spatial unbundling of parts production and assembly currently characterizes
globalization, leading to the worldwide dispersion of pollution. We consider socially op-
timal (cooperative) environmental taxes in a two-country model of global value chains
in which the location of both parts and assembly can differ. When unbundling costs
are so high that parts and assembly must colocate in the pre-globalized world, pollu-
tion is spatially concentrated, and harmonizing environmental taxes maximizes global
welfare. In contrast, with low unbundling costs triggering the dispersion of parts and
thus pollution throughout the world as today, harmonization fails to maximize global
welfare. Similar results hold when the two countries non-cooperatively choose their
environmental taxes.
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1 Introduction
Globalization since the late twentieth century features not just declining barriers to trade and
factor mobility, but also the lowering of costs for coordinating activities within organizations.
This spatial separation of production stages, which Baldwin (2016) refers to as the second
unbundling, has significant implications for the environment as well as trade.1 This is because
it may promote the relocation of polluting industries to countries with lax environmental
standards, an issue known as the pollution haven hypothesis (Markusen et al., 1995; Levinson
and Taylor, 2008).
One measure taken to act against the harmful impact of unbundling production pro-
cesses could be the a harmonization of environmental standards among countries (Sterner
and Ko¨hlin, 2003). Equalizing regulations among countries does not distort the location
decisions of firms and may mitigate the divergence of environmental quality. However, har-
monization may be too naive a policy to address individual environmental impacts given
country heterogeneity.
We aim to evaluate the effectiveness of environmental tax harmonization using a two-
country model of global value chains a` la Baldwin and Venables (2013), where firms produce
a final good through assembling the chain of many parts. Specifically, we characterize the so-
cially optimal environmental taxes (or cooperative equilibrium) that maximize global welfare
and compare them with harmonized taxes. In the pre-globalized world where all production
processes colocate, i.e., before the second unbundling, environmental taxes do nothing to im-
prove the global environment. Setting an equal tax between countries maximizes the global
welfare by not distorting efficient locations. However, in the globalized world where assembly
and parts can be spatially unbundled, i.e., after the second unbundling, environmental taxes
can reduce global environmental damage by avoiding the concentration of polluting pro-
cesses. The simple harmonization is almost never desirable and a more careful coordination
is necessary.
This result is about whether socially optimal and harmonized taxes coincide. One inter-
ested in the need for policy coordination (not just simple harmonization) may also question
whether socially optimal taxes coincide with noncooperative taxes. We show that this is more
likely to hold before the second unbundling than in the globalized world. This is because
prior to the second unbundling, there is little scope for governments to manipulate the loca-
tion of parts through environmental taxes. Each government then lacks a strong incentive
1The first unbundling refers to the spatial separation of consumption and production owing to the devel-
opment of the steam engine in the Industrial Revolution.
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to set specific tax rates so that it realizes the socially optimal taxes in the noncooperative
equilibria. As a result, the equilibrium tax rates chosen by each country do not differ much
from the socially optimal tax rates. The second unbundling, however, makes the location of
parts more sensitive to environmental taxes and thus tax competition leads to equilibrium
tax rates different to the socially optimal tax rates.
We can relate these findings to the experience of countries in the European Union (EU).
From the 1970s onward, the EU sought to harmonize environmental policies among its mem-
ber states. Holzinger et al. (2008) confirm that some 40 environmental measures converged
across 24 advanced economies, including the EU 15, between 1970 and 2000. In addition,
Arbolino et al. (2018) analyze the diffusion process of environmental policies and find that
achievements of the environmental policy objectives of one country converged to the corre-
sponding performance of the other country within the EU 15 from 2000 to 2014. These studies
suggest that harmonization was dominant between member states with similar characteristics
(EU 15) and/or in periods covering years prior to the second unbundling (1970-1990).2
However, it would be difficult to achieve a common goal through harmonized policies
if there are significant disparities in social and economic status among countries. In this
regard, Andonova and VanDeveer (2012) examine environmental policies in the CEE in the
process of EU accession and show that considerable divergence in environmental practices and
institutions persists.3 Furthermore, as international fragmentation of production or offshoring
expands, less developed nations would be reluctant to raise environmental standards to the
level of stringency level closer to those of the advanced economies because in a world of
liberalized trade and investment they fear losing the interest of foreign investors. Although
environmental policy is not a sole determinant of comparative advantage, it does matter at
the margin, particularly for countries whose competitiveness depends on producing at low
cost production, as in our theoretical framework (World Bank, 2020, Ch.5).
2According to Baldwin (2016), the second unbundling accelerated from around 1990 (p.5).
3To overcome the difficulty of harmonizing environmental policies across member countries, the
EU has set out plans in 2020 for monetary and technical support to make up for costs of green
investment, which are known as the Just Transition Mechanism and the Sustainable Europe In-
vestment Plan (Launching the Just Transition Mechanism - for a green transition based on soli-
darity and fairness,15 January 2020, European Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/info/news/
launching-just-transition-mechanism-green-transition-based-solidarity-and-fairness-2020-jan-15_
en, accessed on 9 May 2020). For the EU to become the first climate-free bloc in the world by 2050, the
Just Transition Mechanism aims at providing “tailored financial and practical support to help workers and
generate the necessary investments in regions most affected by the transition.” The direction of the EU
might be in line with our policy prescription.
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1.1 Related studies
Some studies have investigated the environmental impact of mobile firms, but the production
structure in their models is generally too simple to cover fragmentation (Pflu¨ger, 2001; Zeng
and Zhao, 2009; Ishikawa and Okubo, 2017; Forslid et al., 2017; Ikefuji et al., 2016; Voßwinkel
and Birg, 2018).4 Pflu¨ger (2001), for example, examines the effect of pollution taxes on
the international relocation of monopolistically competitive firms. By extending Pfluger’s
model to incorporate transboundary pollution, Ishikawa and Okubo (2017) reveal that trade
liberalization may increase global pollution through firm relocation from a country with
stringent regulation to a country with lax regulation. Voßwinkel and Birg (2018) examine
non/cooperative environmental policies in an oligopolistic competition setting with a specific
focus on the quality of difference of goods. In contrast to these studies where the vertical
linkages between sectors are ignored, we consider a so-called spider structure, comprising
multiple limbs (parts) coming together to make up a body (assembly).
The studies closest to ours are Hamilton and Requate (2004); and Wan et al. (2018), which
examine unilaterally optimal taxes and Nash equilibrium taxes in two-country models with
vertically linked sectors.5 Both these studies assume that upstream firms produce polluting
inputs and are taxed/subsidized by their local government, as do we. However, unlike the
current paper, they also consider international trade in only final goods, which corresponds
to the pre-globalized situation in our analysis. To describe the global value chains in the
present world, we allow for trade in both inputs and assembly relocation.
Using Baldwin and Venables (2013)’s framework, Obashi (2019) characterizes optimal
combinations of trade instruments and finds that policy prescriptions proposed by traditional
trade models are not sufficient to achieve the social optimum. Although environmental issues
were outside the scope of Obashi (2019), her study and ours should be seen as complements as
both emphasize that the evolution of global value chains significantly changes policy design.
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
analyzes the location patterns of parts given assembly location and environmental taxes.
Section 3 allows for endogenous assembly location and examine socially optimal taxes in the
pre-globalized world and Section 4 does this for the globalized world. Section 5 confirms that
our main result holds in different settings. The final section discusses implications for the
4Using an evolutionary game approach, Dijkstra and De Vries (2006) conclude that environmental taxation
may induce polluting firms to stay away from consumers. However, in contrast to our analysis, their focus is
on the spatial unbundling of consumption and production, not the spatial unbundling of production itself.
5See also Wan and Wen (2017). Some studies consider a wider variety of policy tools, including border
tax adjustments as well as emission taxes, although they do not allow for vertical linkages (Lai and Hu, 2008;
Yomogida and Tarui, 2013; Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2014; Sanctuary, 2018; Ogawa and Yanase, 2019).
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real world.
2 The model
Consider a world with two countries, N and S. The two countries have equal population
with unit mass. Each individual inelastically supplies one unit of labor. There are three
types of goods: a final good, a range of parts (intermediate inputs), and a nume´raire good.
The nume´raire good is produced using labor and is costlessly traded, which equalizes its
international price. With choice of units, the wage rates in both countries are equal to unity.
Each part can be produced using labor in both countries and can be internationally traded.
Parts production generates local pollution and is thus taxed by the domestic government. A
single final good producer (assembler) locates in N or S and assembles the range of parts
into one unit of the good. As in Baldwin and Venables (2013), the two countries differ in
two ways: (i) only N consumes the final good and (ii) the average cost of producing parts is
lower in S than in N .
To describe the second unbundling, we distinguish between two types of frictions. If
the assembler is located in S, it must pay trade costs to export the final good to N . If
the locations of parts and assembly differ, the assembler must pay additional unbundling
costs to import parts from abroad. Unbundling costs include communication costs between
headquarters and foreign suppliers as well as physical transportation costs.6
2.1 Preferences
The utility of the representative consumer in i ∈ {N,S} is
Ui = u˜1i +Xi −D(ei), (1)
6As discussed shortly, we assume that both trade costs and unbundling/communication costs increase
proportionally to quantity. There is no general agreement about how to model communication costs (Gokan
et al., 2019). Whether communication costs affect the fixed or variable costs of trade depends on the role
of communications in transactions. The increased use of the Internet (e.g., Freund and Weinhold, 2004),
for example, facilitates the search for trading partners and thus solely affects the fixed costs. However,
in the manufacturing activities, the downstream and upstream production processes need to interact to
coordinate the specification of a customized product and the timing of delivery, which would primarily affect
variable costs. Considering these interactions between headquarters and distant plants, some studies model
communication costs as an iceberg cost proportional to the firm’s output (Duranton and Puga, 2005; Fujita
and Thisse, 2006. Indeed, Fink et al. (2005) find that communication costs exert a significant impact on the
variable costs of trade, thereby affecting trade patterns, especially for differentiated goods. We follow the
latter modeling strategy for communication costs.
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where Xi is the consumption of the nume´raire good, and ei is the pollution level. 1i takes
one if i = N and zero if i = S. The consumer in N obtains u˜ from consuming one unit of
the final good. The disutility from pollution is expressed as D(ei) = γe
2
i /2 with γ > 0. The
budget constraint is
p1i +Xi = 1 + tiei +X, (2)
where p is the final good’s price and ti is the environmental tax by i per unit of pollution.
The income consists of wage (wi = 1), the redistribution of tax revenues (tiei), and the
initial endowment of the nume´raire (X). X ensures positive consumption of the nume´raire.
Substituting (2) into (1) yields the indirect utility Vi.
2.2 Sourcing decision
The assembler first chooses where to locate and then from which country to source parts.
Here, we consider the sourcing decision of the assembler given its location.
Letting z be the index of parts from the set Z = [b, b], the unit cost of any part z ∈ Z is
unity if it is produced in N . If a part z ∈ Z is produced in S, on the other, its unit cost is
b(z) = z with 0 < b < 1 < b. Thus N has a comparative advantage in parts b ∈ [1, b], while S
has it in parts b ∈ [b, 1). S has an average cost advantage over N , i.e., β ≡ 1− (b+ b)/2 > 0.7
Producing one unit of each part generates one unit of local pollution.
The assembler produces one unit of the final good by assembling one unit of each part.
When parts cross the border, additional unbundling costs θ arise. The sourcing decision is
on a parts basis by comparing the international cost difference. Supposing the assembler is
in N , a part z is sourced there if
1 + tN︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost in N
< b(z) + θ + tS︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost in S
,
→ b(z) > bN ≡ min[max{b, 1− θ +∆t}, b],
where ∆t ≡ tN − tS.
The inequality is likely to hold if S’s cost is high (high b(z)), N ’s tax compared with S’s is
low (low ∆t), and unbundling costs are high (high θ).
7The average cost of parts in S is 1
b−b
∫ b
b
b˜db˜ = 1
b−b
· b
2
−b2
2
= b+b
2
, while that in N is 1
b−b
∫ b
b
1db˜ = 1.
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Supposing the assembler is in S, a part z is produced there if
1 + θ + tN︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost in N
> b(z) + tS︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost in S
,
→ b(z) < bS ≡ max[min{b, 1 + θ +∆t}, b],
which can be interpreted analogously.
When unbundling costs are sufficiently high, the two unbundling thresholds degenerate,
i.e., bN = b and bS = b, and all parts colocate with assembly. Specifically, supposing θ > θ ≡
max{1− b+∆t, b− 1−∆t}, Fig. 1 draws such a region (NS in the figure) given assembly
location and taxes.8 The co-location motive of the assembler to save unbundling costs is so
strong that neither comparative advantage nor environmental taxes matter. The parts and
assembly are spatially bundled in the pre-globalization world.
When unbundling costs are sufficiently low, the two unbundling thresholds do not degen-
erate. The location of some parts is dictated by comparative advantage and taxes, not by
the colocation motive. Supposing θ < θ ≡ min{1 − b + ∆t, b − 1 − ∆t}, Fig. 2 depicts the
sourcing pattern.9 Unlike Fig. 1, there are two other regions in Fig. 2, N and S. Parts in N ,
for example, are those in which N has a very strong comparative advantage, and are always
produced in N . As low unbundling costs also make the assembler aware of taxes, the tax
difference now matters for its sourcing decision. The spatial unbundling captures the current
globalization. In what follows, we separately present the analysis of the two cases.
The key mechanism here is that stringent environmental regulations would relocate the
dirtiest parts of the production process to countries with less strict policies, which Cherni-
wchan et al. (2017) refer to as the pollution offshoring hypothesis. If this hypothesis holds,
domestic firms become cleaner. This is not because they have reduced the emission intensity
of their own activities, but because they have shifted the dirtiest parts of their production
out of the country. There are some empirical evidences to support the pollution offshoring
hypothesis. For example, Cherniwchan (2017) found that the emission intensities of the US
manufacturing plants fell in part due to changes in their access to dirtier intermediate inputs
in Mexico following trade liberalization through the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).10
8Note that bN = b holds if b > 1 − θ + ∆t; bS = b holds if b < 1 + θ + ∆t. These conditions lead to
θ > max{1− b+∆t, b− 1−∆t}, which is equivalent to ∆t ∈ (b− θ − 1, b+ θ − 1).
9This condition is equivalent to ∆t ∈ (b+ θ − 1, b− θ − 1).
10The empirical literature is yet to reach a consensus. For instance, Shapiro and Walker (2018) found that
fragmenting production or offshoring was unlikely to account for a large share of the reductions in emissions
6
Fig. 1. Sourcing pattern under high unbundling costs.
Fig. 2. Sourcing pattern under low unbundling costs.
3 High unbundling costs: colocation of parts and as-
sembly
We consider here the case where unbundling costs are high: θ > θ so that parts and assembly
are spatially bundled. We first characterize the assembly location for the given taxes and
then derive the socially optimal taxes.
intensities in US manufacturing production.
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3.1 Assembly location
Let Ci be the total costs of producing one unit of the final good, given assembly in i ∈ {N,S}.
Noting bN = b, we have
CN =
∫ bN
b
(˜b+ θ + tS)db˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
Parts from S
+
∫ b
bN
(1 + tN)db˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
Parts from N
= (b− b)(1 + tN). (3)
Similarly, noting bS = b, we have
CS = τ +
∫ bS
b
(˜b+ tS)db˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
Parts from S
+
∫ b
bS
(1 + θ + tN)db˜︸ ︷︷ ︸
Parts from N
= τ + (b− b)
(
b+ b
2
+ tS
)
, (4)
where trade costs τ enter since the good crosses the border. All parts are sourced locally and
thus θ does not appear here.
The assembler chooses the location that yields the lower Ci. Assembly takes place in N
if
∆C ≡ CN − CS = −τ + (b− b) (β +∆t) ≤ 0,
→ τ ≥ τ ∗ ≡ (b− b) (β +∆t) , (5)
where β ≡ 1− (b+ b)/2,
High trade costs ensure the assembler prefers the proximity to consumers. As seen from the
switching point τ ∗, below which assembly takes place in S, the assembler is more likely to
locate in N as N ’s tax becomes lower (lower ∆t) and/or N ’s parts are more costly (higher
β). This tendency is magnified by the total number of parts: b− b.
3.2 Social optimum
Environmental taxes potentially affect pollution arising from dirty parts production via two
channels. First, as discussed in Section 2.2, a tax increase in one country makes its pro-
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duction cost of parts higher, inducing the assembler to change the sourcing pattern. The
assembler sources more parts from the other country than before, where more pollution and
environmental damage occur. Second, as discussed in Section 3.1, taxes affect the assembler’s
location choice through changes in the switching point, τ ∗, and may lead to a discontinuous
jump in pollution. If an increase in tN makes τ
∗ higher than the exogenously given trade
costs, τ , the assembler moves from S to N and brings N a discontinuous increase in pollution
due to the colocation motive of parts and assembly.
Under high unbundling costs, however, the first channel, i.e., the assembler’s sourcing
decision, is ineffective. The colocation motive is so strong that the unbundling thresholds
degenerate (bN = b; bS = b), implying that environmental taxes affect pollution only through
the second channel, i.e., the assembler’s location decision.
The social/global welfare W is the sum of each country’s indirect utility Vi. Using (1) to
(4), we have
W =

W |A=N =
∑
i=N,S Vi|A=N = u− (b− b)− (γ/2)(b− b)
2 if τ ≥ τ ∗
W |A=S =
∑
i=N,S Vi|A=S = u− τ − (1/2)(b− b)(b+ b)− (γ/2)(b− b)
2 if τ < τ ∗
,
where u ≡ u˜+ 2(1 +X),
and where the subscript A = i ∈ {N,S} indicates the assembler’s location. Since all parts
co-locate with assembly, the pollution level in i is ei = b− b if the assembler is in i and it is
ei = 0 otherwise. We do not examine each component of the social welfare here, but details
about the final good’s price and the environmental damage are in Appendix A1.
Surprisingly, taxes do not enter in W . Since the unbundling thresholds degenerate, the
environmental damage does not depend on taxes: D(ei) = (γ/2)(b − b)
2. Higher taxes
improve welfare by raising tax revenues, while they reduce welfare by raising the final good’s
price. These two counteracting effects offset each other.11 Taxes thus affect parts location
only through changes in assembly location.The social planner cannot manipulate τ ∗ directly,
but can do so indirectly by changing taxes.
Noting that τ ∗ depends on the tax difference, not individual levels, the planner chooses
11For example, if assembly takes place in N , the sum of the consumer surplus and tax revenues in the
world is
(u˜− CN ) + tN (b− b) = u˜− (b− b)(1 + tN ) + tN (b− b)
= u˜− (b− b),
which is independent of taxes. The same argument holds if assembly takes place in S. See Appendix A1 for
the exact welfare expressions.
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∆t to attain max{W |A=N ,W |A=S} by (indirectly) manipulating the switching point τ
∗. The
optimal tax difference for any trade costs turns out to be ∆t = 0, as Fig. 3 illustrates.12
That is, the planner should not intervene in the assembler’s location choice. If the location
of assembly were manipulated, comparative advantage would be distorted and thus the total
cost would not be minimized. In addition, assembly location affects local environmental
damage, but does not affect global environmental damage, since the assembler sources all
parts locally. The planner is thus unable to reduce the global damage by changing assembly
location. The planner fully respects the cost-minimization location choice of the assembler
by setting the tax difference to zero. The socially optimal switching point then becomes
τ̂ ∗ ≡ τ ∗|∆t=0 = β(b− b).
Fig. 3. Socially optimal tax harmonization (dashed line) and assembly location under high
unbundling costs.
Proposition 1. Under high unbundling costs, environmental tax harmonization, i.e.,
tN = tS, always maximizes social welfare for any level of trade costs.
4 Low unbundling costs: separation of parts and as-
sembly
We turn to the case where unbundling costs are low: θ < θ. Low unbundling costs allow
parts and assembly to locate in different countries, capturing the second unbundling.
12All proofs of the propositions are in Appendix A2. Given τ , there may be other optimal tax differences
than ∆t = 0 (see Fig. A2). But only ∆t = 0 maximizes social welfare for any τ .
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4.1 Assembly location
As Fig. 2 suggests, the two unbundling thresholds are within the interval of [b, b]. The total
cost of the final good in each location is respectively
CN =
(
θ + tS +
b+ bN
2
)
(bN − b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Parts from S
+(1 + tN)(b− bN)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Parts from N
, (6)
CS = τ +
(
tS +
b+ bS
2
)
(bS − b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Parts from S
+(1 + θ + tN)(b− bS)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Parts from N
, (7)
where bN = 1− θ +∆t and bS = 1 + θ +∆t. Assembly takes place in N if
∆C ≡ CN − CS = −τ + 2θ
(
1−
b+ b
2
+ ∆t
)
≤ 0,
→ τ ≥ τ ∗∗ ≡ 2θ (β +∆t) .
Unlike τ ∗ defined in (5), τ ∗∗ depends on θ. Lower unbundling costs make the colocation of
parts and assembly less important, whereas they make the proximity to the consumer in N
more important. A lower θ decreases τ ∗∗, making the assembler more likely to locate in N .
4.2 Social optimum
In contrast to the case of high unbundling costs, environmental taxes affect pollution through
both the assembler’s sourcing and location decisions. A tax increase in one country leads
to the offshoring of dirty parts production and may reduce pollution there without losing
out the assembler. In the globalized world, taxes are more effective in reducing pollution
than in the pre-globalized world. We thus expect that there is a need for more careful tax
coordination than with just simple harmonization.
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With low unbundling costs, we use (1), (2), (6), and (7) to express the social welfare as
W =

W |A=S =
∑
i=N,S Vi|A=S if τ < τ
∗∗
W |A=N =
∑
i=N,S Vi|A=N if τ ≥ τ
∗∗
,
W |A=S = u−
[
τ +
1
2
(b+ bS)(bS − b) + (1 + θ)(b− bS)
]
−
γ
2
[(b− bS)
2 + (bS − b)
2],
W |A=N = u−
[(
θ +
b+ bN
2
)
(bN − b) + (b− bN)
]
−
γ
2
[(b− bN)
2 + (bN − b)
2].
Unlike the case of high unbundling costs, the tax difference ∆t affects not just the switching
point τ ∗∗ but the unbundling thresholds bi. The planner chooses ∆t to maximize W by
(indirectly) manipulating bi as well as τ
∗∗. Although we do not look at each component of
welfare here, one can find the details about the final good’s price and the environmental
damage in Appendix A1.
Formally, we can the socially optimal tax difference as follows and is illustrated in Fig.
4:13
∆t =


∆t|A=S ≡ −
2γ(β + θ)
2γ + 1
if τ < τa
∆t̂+ ε if τa ≤ τ < τ̂ ∗∗
∆t̂ ≡
τ
2θ
− β if τ̂ ∗∗ ≤ τ < τ b
∆t|A=N ≡
2γ(θ − β)
2γ + 1
if τ ≥ τ b
,
where τa ≡
2θ(β − 2γθ)
2γ + 1
, τ̂ ∗∗ ≡
2βθ
2γ + 1
, τ b ≡
2θ(2γθ + β)
2γ + 1
,
and ε > 0 is a sufficiently small constant.14 τ̂ ∗∗ is the socially optimal switching point.
The socially optimal tax difference would be zero if there were no environmental damage
γ = 0. The planner intervenes solely for reducing the global environmental damage. Since the
global damage becomes more severe as pollution is more spatially concentrated, the planner
aims to diversify the location of parts. The optimal tax difference is thus set to make the
distribution of parts production more equal.15
As trade costs τ fall, more parts are shifted from N to S because (i) S’s cost advantage
13For τa to be positive, the sensitivity of environmental damage is assumed not to be too large: γ < γ ≡
β/(b− b).
14In Fig. 4, we ignore ε. ∆t|A=N can be negative if θ is low enough.
15It can be checked that the socially optimal unbundling threshold bi is closer to the middle point of the
range (b+ b)/2 than the unbundling threshold under no taxes.
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begins to matter and (ii) the assembler moves from N to S. To avoid the concentration of
pollution, N ’s tax compared with S’s is set higher than before and thus the optimal tax
difference decreases with τ . The simple harmonization is no longer desirable except for a
special case at which the optimal tax difference coincides with zero.
Fig. 4. Socially optimal tax difference (dashed line) and assembly location under low
unbundling costs.
Proposition 2. Under low unbundling costs, environmental tax harmonization never
maximizes social welfare except for a specific level of trade costs.
5 Extensions
5.1 Environmental damage function
We assumed a convex form of the environmental damage function, i.e., D(ei) = γe
2
i /2, which
is fairly common in the literature (e.g., Ulph, 1996; Copeland and Taylor, 2005, Ch. 2). Our
main results, Propositions 1 and 2, do not depend on the specific form of damage function,
as we argue below.
Under high unbundling costs, where all parts production colocates with assembly, pol-
lution occurs only in the country with assembly. The levels of pollution and environmental
damage are then independent of taxes. Therefore, the social planner does not care about the
13
function form of D(·). Regardless of whether it is convex or concave, the harmonized tax
rates are also socially optimal ones.
Under low unbundling costs, the tax difference does affect which parts are produced in
which country, even when it does not change assembly location. In this case, the harmonized
tax rates can generally never be the socially optimal ones no matter what the function form
of D(·) may be. For illustration, consider a situation where θ is close to zero and γ is so high
that the planner cares solely about the environmental damage. The sum of the environmental
damage in each country is given by (γ/2)[D(eN)+D(eS)] = (γ/2)[D(b−b)+D(b−b)], where
b ≃ 1+∆t is the unbundling threshold below (above) which parts are produced in S (N). The
planner attempts to minimize this by altering the unbundling threshold b through changes
in the tax difference ∆t ≡ tN − tS.
If D(·) is convex, as assumed in the main analysis, the global damage is minimized
when b is at the middle point: (b + b)/2.16 The socially optimal tax difference must satisfy
b = 1+∆t = (b+ b)/2, or ∆t = β ≡ 1− (b+ b)/2 > 0. The harmonized tax rates would lead
to too much pollution in S.
If D(·) is concave, the global damage is minimized when b is at either of the endpoints: b
or b.17 The socially optimal tax difference must be either ∆t = 1− b > 0 or ∆t = 1− b < 0
to induce all parts production to take place in one country. Tax harmonization that allows
for the diversification of parts production is then poor policy.
5.2 Nash equilibrium vs. social optimum
The focus of this paper is on whether the harmonization policy maximizes social welfare.
We could also ask whether decentralized policies chosen by noncooperative governments, i.e.,
Nash equilibrium policies, lead to the socially optimal outcome. Here, we here intuitively
argue that the Nash equilibrium tax difference is more likely to differ from the socially
optimal one under low unbundling costs than under high unbundling costs. Our main finding
carries over: globalization calls for more careful international coordination than a simple
harmonization rule. The full characterization of Nash equilibria is relegated to Appendices
A3 and A4.
16The FOC for the minimization problem is −D′(b − b) +D′(b − b) = 0, noting that the SOC is satisfied
because of the convexity of D(·): D′′(b− b) +D′′(b− b) > 0. From the FOC, we have D′(b− b) = D′(b− b),
or b = (b+ b)/2.
17This result comes from the fact that the SOC for the minimization problem is not satisfied: D′′(b− b) +
D′′(b− b) < 0.
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5.2.1 High unbundling costs
We consider the governments’ incentive to deviate from the harmonized tax rates: tN =
tS, which maximizes social welfare (see Proposition 1). Since the unbundling thresholds
degenerate under high unbundling costs, i.e., bN = b; bS = b, the levels of pollution and
environmental damage are independent of taxes. The governments can then do little to
reduce local pollution and thus do not tend to prefer specific tax rates.
If trade costs are sufficiently high such that τ ≥ τ̂ ∗, assembly takes place in N (see Section
3). In this case, government S does not wish to challenge government N over assembly by
reducing tS because attracting assembly by the reduced tS would not bring with it much tax
revenue. As there are neither assembly nor tax revenues in S, government S does not have any
incentive to raise tS, either. Government N is also unwilling to change tN because tN does not
enter its objective function.18 The harmonized tax rates are then indeed Nash-equilibrium
ones.
If τ < τ̂ ∗, where assembly takes place in S, government S has an incentive to set tS
higher than tN because by doing so S can increase tax revenues while not inducing assembly
relocation. The Nash equilibrium tax difference can never be zero.
In sum, if τ ≥ τ̂ ∗, the harmonized tax rates are the Nash equilibrium ones as well as the
socially optimal ones.
5.2.2 Low unbundling costs
Under low unbundling costs, the unbundling thresholds do not degenerate, i.e., bN = 1 −
θ + ∆t; bS = 1 + θ + ∆t. The country without assembly also suffer environmental damage
from dirty input production, implying that both governments, regardless of hosting assembly,
can affect the level of pollution through taxes. They want to choose a specific tax rate that
maximizes their national welfare, which is in stark contrast to the case of high unbundling
costs.
A tax increase by government i ∈ {N,S} causes the relocation of parts and thus pollution
to j 6= i. Government j then wishes to increase its tax rate as well to prevent environmental
damage. That is, the two countries’ tax rates are strategic complements: both governments
wish to change their tax rates in the same direction.19 Therefore, irrespective of the level
18An increase in tN has a positive effect on tax revenues and a negative effect on the consumer surplus,
which cancel each other. Therefore, tN does not matter for government N ’s welfare.
19The strategic complementarity leads to a race to the top, in which each country’s tax rate at the Nash
equilibrium is higher than their rate at the social optimal. The argument here assumes that the governments
emphasize environmental damage, i.e., a high γ. If instead γ is low and thus the governments emphasize tax
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of trade costs, the Nash equilibrium tax difference is in general different from the socially
optimal one in such a way that the former is smaller than the latter.
6 Conclusion
Desirable environmental policies may drastically change before and after the current global-
ization characterized by the spatial unbundling of production processes. In the pre-globalized
world, environmental tax harmonization avoids distorting efficient location choices and max-
imizes global welfare, despite heterogeneity between countries. In the globalized world, how-
ever, it leads to the excessive spatial concentration of pollution and (almost) never maximizes
global welfare. The second unbundling may then call for careful international coordination
beyond simple harmonization. These theoretical findings have implications for the experi-
ences of earlier member states of the European Union (EU) prior to 2004, i.e., the EU 15,
and the newer member states among the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries
since 2004.
We highlight two important issues that have not been addressed in the current paper.
First, it would be worthwhile investigating how we should coordinate environmental and
trade polices such as import tariffs (Lai and Hu, 2008; Yomogida and Tarui, 2013; Keen
and Kotsogiannis, 2014; Sanctuary, 2018; Ogawa and Yanase, 2019). In the age of the
second unbundling, the location of parts is sensitive to the international cost differences
generated by both policy measures. Key questions would be as follows. Which measure
is effective for the global environment? Are tariffs necessary as border tax adjustments
given different emission taxes at home and abroad? Second, it would also be interesting to
consider pollution emitted during the transportation of goods, considering its importance
among all sources of pollution (Abe et al., 2014; Ishikawa and Tarui, 2018).20 Transportation
pollution is particularly relevant in snake-style production, in which parts move sequentially
from upstream to downstream with value added at each stage. The snake-style production
tends to generate more pollution than the spider-style production we consider in this paper,
because parts produced in one country can be shipped multiple times before they reach the
final stage. Incorporating these aspects into our model would lead to greater externalities
revenues, the complementarity results in a race to the bottom.
20For example, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from transportation account for 28.9 percent of total US
GHG emissions in 2017, making it the largest contributor to US GHG emissions. Source: U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions, accessed
on March 23, 2020).
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and thus larger deviations between harmonized and socially optimal taxes. We leave these
issues for future research.
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Appendix to “Is Environmental Tax Harmonization
Desirable in Global Value Chains?”
Cheng Haitao Hayato Kato Ayako Obashi
A1 Final good’s price and environmental damage
High-unbundling-cost case. From the discussion in Section 3.1, we obtain the final good’s
price as
p = min {CN , CS} =

CN = (b− b)(1 + tN) if τ ≥ τ
∗
CS = τ + (b− b)
[
(b+ b)/2 + tS
]
if τ < τ ∗
,
which is shown in Fig. A1. We note that assembly takes place in A = N (A = S) if τ ≥ τ ∗
(τ < τ ∗).
Fig. A1. Final good’s price under high unbundling costs.
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The environmental damage in each country is
D(eN) =

(γ/2)(b− b)
2 if τ ≥ τ ∗
0 if τ < τ ∗
,
D(eS) =

0 if τ ≥ τ
∗
(γ/2)(b− b)2 if τ < τ ∗
.
The sum of the two equals
D(eN) +D(eS) = (γ/2)(b− b)
2 for any τ .
These are illustrated in Fig. A2.
Fig. A2. Environmental damage under high unbundling costs.
Low-unbundling-cost case. From the discussion in Section 4.1, we obtain the final good’s
price as
p = min {CN , CS} =


CN =
(
θ + tS +
b+ bN
2
)
(bN − b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Parts from S
+(1 + tN)(b− bN)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Parts from N
if τ ≥ τ ∗∗
CS = τ +
(
tS +
b+ bS
2
)
(bS − b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Parts from S
+(1 + θ + tN)(b− bS)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Parts from N
if τ < τ ∗∗
,
which is shown in Fig. A3. We note that assembly takes place in A = N (A = S) if τ ≥ τ ∗∗
(τ < τ ∗∗).
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Fig, A3. Final good’s price under low unbundling costs.
The environmental damage in each country is
D(eN) =

D(eN)
∣∣
A=N
= (γ/2)(b− bN)
2 if τ ≥ τ ∗∗
D(eN)
∣∣
A=S
= (γ/2)(b− bS)
2 if τ < τ ∗∗
,
D(eS) =

D(eS)
∣∣
A=N
= (γ/2)(bN − b)
2 if τ ≥ τ ∗∗
D(eS)
∣∣
A=S
= (γ/2)(bS − b)
2 if τ < τ ∗∗
.
The global damage is then
D(eN) +D(eS) =

[D(eN) +D(eS)]
∣∣
A=N
= (γ/2)
[
(b− bN)
2 + (bN − b)
2
]
if τ ≥ τ ∗∗
[D(eN) +D(eS)]
∣∣
A=S
= (γ/2)
[
(b− bS)
2 + (bS − b)
2
]
if τ < τ ∗∗
.
We note the following:
D(eN)|A=N > D(eN)|A=S,
D(eS)|A=N < D(eS)|A=S,
D(eN)|A=S −D(eS)|A=S = −γ(b− b)(β +∆t+ θ) < 0,
D(eS)|A=N −D(eN)|A=S = γ(bN − b+ b− bS)(β +∆t) > 0,
D(eS)|A=S −D(eN)|A=N = γ(bS − b+ b− bN)(β +∆t) > 0,
[D(eN) +D(eS)]
∣∣
A=S
− [D(eN) +D(eS)]
∣∣
A=N
= γ(bS − bN)(bN + bS − b− b)
= 4γθ(β +∆t) > 0.
Although the inequalities above unambiguously hold, we still need to check the relationship
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between the two countries’ pollution levels when the assembly is in N :
D(eN)|A=N −D(eS)|A=N = −γ(b− b)(β +∆t− θ).
Country N ’s pollution level tends to be lower when country S’s average cost advantage is
larger (higher β); the tax difference is larger (high ∆t); and the unbundling costs are lower
(lower θ). Depending on the sign of β +∆t − θ, the environmental damage is illustrated in
Figs A4 and A5.
Fig. A4. Environmental damage under low unbundling costs if β +∆t− θ < 0.
Fig. A5. Environmental damage under low unbundling costs if β +∆t− θ > 0.
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A2 Proofs of propositions
A2.1 Proof of Proposition 1
From (1), (2), (3), and (4), the indirect utility of the representative agent in each country is
given by
VN =

VN |A=S = u˜− CS + 1 +X if τ < τ
∗
VN |A=N = u˜− CN + tN(b− b)− (γ/2)(b− b)
2 + 1 +X if τ ≥ τ ∗
,
VS =

VS|A=S = tS(b− b)− (γ/2)(b− b)
2 + 1 +X if τ < τ ∗
VS|A=N = 1 +X if τ ≥ τ
∗
,
where CS = τ + (b − b)/[(b + b)/2 + tS]; CN = (b − b)(1 + tN); τ
∗ ≡ (b − b)(β + ∆t);
β ≡ 1− (b+ b)/2. The social welfare is defined by the sum of each country’s indirect utility:
W =

W |A=S = VN |A=S + VS|A=S = u− τ − (1/2)(b− b)(b+ b)− (γ/2)(b− b)
2 if τ < τ ∗
W |A=N = VN |A=N + VS|A=N = u− (b− b)− (γ/2)(b− b)
2 if τ ≥ τ ∗
,
where u ≡ u˜+ 2(1 +X),
as given in the main text.
Taxes do not enter the expressions of social welfare and only affect the location decision
of the assembler. The social planner thus chooses the assembly location through taxes that
gives the higher social welfare. A simple comparison of welfare between the two locations
reveals
max{W |A=N ,W |A=S} =

W |A=S = u− τ − (b− b)(b+ b)/2− (γ/2)(b− b)
2 if τ < τ̂ ∗
W |A=N = u− (b− b)− (γ/2)(b− b)
2 if τ ≥ τ̂ ∗
,
where W |A=N = W |A=S holds at τ̂
∗ ≡ β(b− b).
To see the results intuitively, it is helpful to illustrate the assembly location pattern in
the (τ,∆) plane, as Fig. A6 shows. The upward-sloping line is the cost-indifference one:
τ = τ ∗, or equivalently, ∆t = τ/(b − b) − β, which represents N ’s maximum tax rate that
keeps assembly there. The social planner should set taxes so that the assembly locates in N
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if τ ≥ τ̂ ∗ and it locates in S otherwise. The optimal tax difference is thus
∆t

> τ/(b− b)− β if τ < τ̂
∗
≤ τ/(b− b)− β if τ ≥ τ̂ ∗
,
which is represented by the shaded area in Fig. A7. As is clear from Fig. A7, only the tax
harmonization ∆t = 0 (dashed line) maximizes the social welfare for any level of trade costs.
Fig. A6. Location of assembly under high unbundling costs.
Fig. A7. Socially optimal tax difference (shaded area) and assembly location under high
unbundling costs.
A2.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We first derive the unconstrained socially optimal taxes given the location of assembly. With
low unbundling costs, the indirect utility of the representative agent in each country is given
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by
VN =

VN |A=S = u˜− CS + tN(b− bS)− (γ/2)(b− bS)
2 + 1 +X if τ < τ ∗∗
VN |A=N = u˜− CN + tN(b− bN)− (γ/2)(b− bN)
2 + 1 +X if τ ≥ τ ∗∗
,
VS =

VS|A=S = tS(bS − b)− (γ/2)(bS − b)
2 + 1 +X if τ < τ ∗∗
VS|A=N = tS(bN − b)− (γ/2)(bN − b)
2 + 1 +X if τ ≥ τ ∗∗
,
where Ci is defined in (6) and (7); and τ
∗∗ ≡ 2θ(β +∆t); bN = 1− θ +∆t; bS = 1 + θ +∆t.
The social welfare is defined by the sum of the two country’s indirect utility:
W =

W |A=S =
∑
i=N,S Vi|A=S if τ < τ
∗∗
W |A=N =
∑
i=N,S Vi|A=N if τ ≥ τ
∗∗
,
W |A=S = u−
[
τ +
1
2
(b+ bS)(bS − b) + (1 + θ)(b− bS)
]
− (γ/2)[(b− bS)
2 + (bS − b)
2],
W |A=N = u−
[(
θ +
b+ bN
2
)
(bN − b) + (b− bN)
]
− (γ/2)[(b− bN)
2 + (bN − b)
2],
as given in the text.
For the social welfare level at each assembly location, the first-order conditions give
dW |A=S
dtN
= −
dW |A=S
dtS
= 0,
→ (tN − tS)|A=S = −
2γ
2γ + 1
(θ + β) ≡ ∆t|A=S,
dW |A=N
dtN
= −
dW |A=N
dtS
= 0,
→ (tN − tS)|A=N =
2γ
2γ + 1
(θ − β) ≡ ∆t|A=N .
Since dW |A=i/dtN and (−dW |A=i/dtS) are collinear, what matters for the social welfare
maximization is the tax difference and not the absolute levels of taxes.
We then allow for endogenous assembly location and see how it affects the optimal taxes.
As in Appendix A2.1, it is helpful to consider in the (τ,∆t) plane. The upward-sloping line in
Fig. A8 is the cost-indifference line: τ = τ ∗∗, or equivalently, ∆t = τ/(2θ)−β ≡ ∆t̂. Putting
the unconstrained maximizers derived before into the plane, we can obtain Fig. A9 and
identify that there are three cases to be considered. Letting τa (or τ b) be the intersection
of the cost-indifference line and ∆t|A=S (or ∆t|A=N), the three cases are characterized as
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follows.
Case (i) τ < τa. The social optimum will be either the constrained maximum
with assembly in N , W |A=N, ∆t=∆t̂, or the unconstrained maximum with assembly in S,
W |A=S, ∆t=∆t|A=S .
Case (ii) τa ≤ τ < τ b. The social optimum will be either the constrained maxi-
mum with assembly in N , W |A=N, ∆t=∆t̂, or the constrained maximum with assembly in S,
W |A=S, ∆t=∆t̂+ε.
Case (iii) τ ≥ τ b. The social optimum will be either the unconstrained maximum
with assembly in N , W |A=N, ∆t=∆t|A=N , or the constrained maximum with assembly in S,
W |A=S, ∆t=∆t̂+ε.
Fig. A8. Location of assembly under low unbundling costs.
Fig. A9. Unconstrained optimal tax differences under low unbundling costs.
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For the latter reference, it is informative here to compare the constrained maxima between
the two locations.
W |A=N, ∆t=∆t̂ −W |A=S, ∆t=∆t̂+ε = τ + β(bN − bS) + 2[θ + γ(bN − bS)][1− (bN + bS)/2− β]
= τ(2γ + 1)− 2βθ,
noting that ε is sufficiently small. On ∆t = ∆t̂, it holds that bN − bS = −2θ and bN + bS =
2(1 + ∆t̂). We thus have W |A=N, ∆t=∆t̂ ≥ W |A=S, ∆t=∆t̂+ε if τ ≥ τ̂
∗∗ ≡ 2βθ/(2γ + 1) and
W |A=N, ∆t=∆t̂ < W |A=S, ∆t=∆t̂+ε otherwise. It can be also checked that τ
a < τ̂ ∗∗ < τ b.
With these in hand, we will derive the socially optimal taxes in each case.
Case (i) τ < τa. In this case, we have
W |A=S, ∆t=∆t|A=S > W |A=S, ∆t=∆t̂ > W |A=N, ∆t=∆t̂.
The socially optimal outcome is the unconstrained maximum with assembly in S.
Case (ii) τa ≤ τ < τ b. As τ̂ ∗∗ is in between τa and τ b, this case is further divided into
two subcases.
Case (ii-a) τa ≤ τ < τ̂ ∗∗. We have
W |A=S, ∆t=∆t̂+ε > W |A=N, ∆t=∆t̂.
The socially optimal outcome is that assembly takes place in S and the tax difference is set
at ∆t = ∆t̂+ ε.
Case (ii-b) τ̂ ∗∗ ≤ τ < τ b. We have
W |A=N, ∆t=∆t˜ ≥ W |A=S, ∆t=∆t̂+ε.
The socially optimal outcome is that assembly takes place in N and the tax difference is set
at ∆t = ∆t̂.
Case (iii) τ ≥ τ b. In this case, we have
W |A=N, ∆t=∆t|A=N > W |A=N, ∆t=∆t̂ > W |A=S, ∆t=∆t̂+ε.
29
The socially optimal outcome is the unconstrained maximum with assembly in N .
In sum, the socially optimal tax difference is
∆t =


∆t|A=S = −
2γ(β + θ)
2γ + 1
if τ < τa
∆t̂+ ε if τa ≤ τ < τ̂ ∗∗
∆t̂ =
τ
2θ
− β if τ̂ ∗∗ ≤ τ < τ b
∆t|A=N =
2γ(θ − β)
1 + 2γ
if τ ≥ τ b
,
where τa ≡
2θ(β − 2γθ)
2γ + 1
, τ̂ ∗∗ ≡
2βθ
2γ + 1
, τ b ≡
2θ(2γθ + β)
2γ + 1
,
as given in the main text.
A3 Nash equilibrium outcome under high unbundling
costs
As noted in Appendix A2.1, under high unbundling costs, the indirect utility of the repre-
sentative agent in each country is given by
VN =

VN |A=S = u˜− CS + 1 +X if τ < τ
∗
VN |A=N = u˜− CN + tN(b− b)− (γ/2)(b− b)
2 + 1 +X if τ ≥ τ ∗
,
VS =

VS|A=S = tS(b− b)− (γ/2)(b− b)
2 + 1 +X if τ < τ ∗
VS|A=N = 1 +X if τ ≥ τ
∗
,
where CN = (b − b)(1 + tN); CS = τ + (b − b)[(b + b)/2 + tS]; τ
∗ ≡ (b − b)(β + ∆t). The
unbundling thresholds degenrate: bN = b; bS = b.
(i) First, we investigate S’s best responses given N ’s pollution tax. Evaluating the switching
point τ ∗ at taxes making the locations indifferent to S (i.e., VS|A=S = VS|A=N), we get the
threshold tax rate: t̂N = τ/(b− b)− β + (γ/2)(b− b).
If tN ∈ [0, t̂N ], S imposes a pollution tax satisfying tS ≥ tN − τ/(b− b)+β so as to induce
A = N and VS|A=N = 0. Or else, S’s welfare is negative (A = S, VS|A=S < 0).
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If tN ∈ (t̂N ,∞), S imposes a pollution tax satisfying tS < tN − τ/(b− b) + β − ε so as to
induce A = S and positive welfare where ε is a sufficiently small constant.
(ii) Second, we investigate N ’s best responses given S’s pollution tax. Similarly, evaluating
the switching point τ ∗ at taxes making the locations indifferent to N (i.e., VN |A=S = VN |A=N),
we get the threshold tax rate: t̂S = −τ/(b− b) + β + (γ/2)(b− b).
If tS ∈ [0, t̂S), then VN |A=S > VN |A=N holds. N imposes tN > tS + τ/(b − b) − β and
chooses A = S.
If tS ∈ [t̂S,∞), then VN |A=S < VN |A=N holds. N imposes tN < tS + τ/(b − b) − β and
chooses A = N .
(iii) Third, we combine (i) and (ii) together to get the Nash equilibria as follows.
If τ/(b − b) − β < 0, or τ < τ̂ ∗, both locations can be the Nash equilibria, i.e., ANE ∈
{N,S}. The Nash equilibrium tax differences at ANE = N are ∆tNE < 2[τ/(b− b)− β], and
those at ANE = S are ∆tNE = τ/(b− b)− β.
If τ/(b− b)− β = 0, or τ = τ̂ ∗, the tax differences and the assembly location at the Nash
equilibria are respectively ∆tNE ≤ 0 and ANE = N .
If τ/(b− b)− β > 0, or τ > τ̂ ∗, the tax differences and the assembly location at the Nash
equilibria are respectively ∆tNE < τ/(b− b)− β and ANE = N .
From Appendix A2, we can see that the Nash equilibria coincides with the socially optimal
outcomes for τ ≥ τ̂ ∗, which are shown in Fig. A10.
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Fig. A10. Nash equilibrium tax difference (shaded area and ∆t = τ/(b− b)− β) and
assembly location under high unbundling costs
A4 Nash equilibrium outcome under low unbundling
costs
As noted in Appendix A2.2, the indirect utility of the representative agent in each country
is given by
VN =

VN |A=S = u˜− CS + tN(b− bS)− (γ/2)(b− bS)
2 + 1 +X if τ < τ ∗∗
VN |A=N = u˜− CN + tN(b− bN)− (γ/2)(b− bN)
2 + 1 +X if τ ≥ τ ∗∗
,
VS =

VS|A=S = tS(bS − b)− (γ/2)(bS − b)
2 + 1 +X if τ < τ ∗∗
VS|A=N = tS(bN − b)− (γ/2)(bN − b)
2 + 1 +X if τ ≥ τ ∗∗
,
where Ci is defined in (6) and (7); and τ
∗∗ ≡ 2θ(β +∆t); bN = 1− θ +∆t; bS = 1 + θ +∆t.
(i) First, we derive the best responses of each country with exogenous assembly location.
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N ’s best response given tS and A = N is
t˜BRN (tS)|A=N ≡ tN =
γ
1 + γ
tS +
γ
1 + γ
(b− 1 + θ).
N ’s best response given tS and A = S is
t˜BRN (tS)|A=S ≡ tN =
γ
1 + γ
tS +
γ
1 + γ
(b− 1− θ).
S’s best response given tN and A = N is
t˜BRS (tN)|A=N ≡ tS =
1 + γ
2 + γ
tN +
1 + γ
2 + γ
(1− θ − b).
S’s best response given tN and A = S is
t˜BRS (tN)|A=S ≡ tS =
1 + γ
2 + γ
tN +
1 + γ
2 + γ
(1 + θ − b).
(ii) Second, we allow for endogenous location and derive S’s best response with endogenous
assembly given tN .
tBRS (tN) =


t˜BRS (tN)|A=N if tN < t̂
∗
N
tS|A=S = tN − τ/(2θ) + β if t̂
∗
N ≤ tN ≤ t
1
N
t˜BRS (tN)|A=S if tN > t
1
N
,
where t̂∗N = τ(2+γ)/(2θ)+(3+γ)θ+(γ/2)(b−b)+(b−1)−
√
2(2 + γ)τ + 2θ(2 + γ)(b− b+ 2θ)
is the switching point of assembly location at which S is indifferent to where assembly takes
place; t1N = (2 + γ)[τ/(2θ)− γ] + (1 + γ)(1 + θ − b).
21 It is illustrated in Fig. A11.
21We need to assume that θ < (b − b)/2(1 + γ) to avoid the case where the switching point falls between
the two exogenous best response lines. The assumption is reasonable since we restrict our attention to the
case of low unbundling costs.
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Fig. A11. S’s best response with endogenous assembly location (red curve).
(iii) Third, we allow for endogenous location and derive N ’s best response given tS.
tBRN (tS) =


t˜BRN (tS)|A=S if tS < t
1
S
tN |A=S ≡ tS + τ/(2θ)− β if t
1
S ≤ tS ≤ t̂
∗
S
tN |A=N ≡ tS + τ/(2θ)− β if t̂
∗
S < tS ≤ t
2
S
t˜BRN (tN)|A=N if tS > t
2
S
,
where t̂∗S ≡ γ(b − 1) − (1 + γ)[τ/(2θ) − β] is the switching point of assembly location at
which N is indifferent to where assembly takes place; t1S ≡ γ(b− 1− θ)− (1+ γ)[τ/(2θ)− β];
t2S ≡ γ(b − 1 + θ) − (1 + γ)[τ/(2θ) − β]. Note that t̂
∗
S = (t
1
S + t
2
S)/2. N ’s best response is
illustrated in Fig. A12.
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Fig. A12. S’s best response with endogenous assembly location (blue curve).
(iv) Fourth, we derive Nash equilibria with endogenous assembly location. We only need to
combine the best responses of the two countries together and then to see whether there exist
intersections or overlapping lines. Fig. A13 draws the cost-indifference line at τ = 0, i.e.,
τ ∗∗ ≡ 2θ(β + ∆t) = 0, or tN = tS − β. Note that the cost-indifference line locates above
the intersection of t˜BRN (tS)|A=S and t˜
BR
S (tN)|A=S. Therefore, there are two types of Nash
equilibria depending on τ : one characterized by the cost-indifference line; the other by the
intersection of t˜BRN (tS)|A=N and t˜
BR
S (tN)|A=N , i.e., point B.
Fig. A13. Cost-indifference line at τ = 0.
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We have seen that N is indifferent to where assembly takes place if tN = t
∗
N , so is S at
tS = t̂
∗
S, or equivalently tN = t̂
∗∗
N ≡ t̂
∗
S + τ/(2θ)− β. Noting that the two countries’ switching
points are t̂∗N and t̂
∗∗
N , the two switching points are equalized at
22
τ1 ≡
θ
[√
θ(2 + γ){2γ2(θ + b− b) + γ(2 + 2b− 4b+ θ)}+ 2(1− b)− (γ2 + 3γ + 1)θ − (b− 1)(1 + γ)
]
(1 + γ)2
.
Then, for τ < τ1, the Nash equilibria occur on the cost-indifference line where ∆t|
NE
A=S =
τ/(2θ)− β (see Fig. A15). At point B, N ’s and S’s pollution taxes are
tBN =
γ(2 + γ)
2(1 + γ)
(b− 1 + θ) +
γ
2
(1− θ − b),
tBS =
γ2
2
(b− 1 + θ) +
1 + γ
2
(1− θ − b).
Equalizing tBN and t̂
∗
N gives
τ2 ≡
2θ
√
2θ(1 + γ)
[
γ2(b− b) + γ(θ + 1 + 2b− 3b)
]
+ 2(1− b)− θ(2γ2 + 3γ + 2)− (b− 1)(2 + γ)
(1 + γ)(2 + γ)
Then, for τ > τ2 the Nash equilibrium occurs at point B where ∆t|
NE
A=N = γ(b−1+θ)/[2(γ+
1)]− (1− θ − b)/2 (see Fig. A18).
For τ1 ≤ τ ≤ τ2, there are two possible cases: (a) both countries still impose pollution
taxes along the cost-indifference line, but they choose different assembly locations (see Fig.
A16); (b) their best-response curves have neither intersections nor overlapping parts (see Fig.
A17). In both cases, there is no Nash equilibrium.
To conclude, we have
∆tNE =


∆t|NEA=S ≡ τ/(2θ)− β if τ < τ1
No Nash equilibrium if τ1 ≤ τ ≤ τ2
∆t|NEA=N ≡ γ(b− 1 + θ)/[2(γ + 1)]− (1− θ − b)/2 if τ > τ2
,
which is shown in Fig. A14. The Nash equilibria coincides with the socially optimal outcomes
only for τ ∈ (τa, τ̂ ∗∗), which is narrower than τ ≥ τ̂ ∗. We can thus conclude that the
22It can checked that ∂t̂∗
N
/∂τ > 0; ∂t̂∗∗
N
/∂τ < 0; and t̂∗
N
< t̂∗∗
N
holds at τ = 0.
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decentralized policy outcomes are more likely to deviate from the socially optimal ones in
the age of the second unbundling.
Fig. A14. Nash equilibrium tax difference (blue line) and assebly location under low
unbundling costs.
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Fig. A15. Nash equilibrium for τ < τ1.
Fig. A16. Case (a) for τ1 ≤ τ ≤ τ2: overlapping line with different assembly location.
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Fig. A17. Case (b) for τ1 ≤ τ ≤ τ2: no intersections.
Fig. A18. Nash equilibrium for τ > τ2.
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